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work in the county clerk's office and, if he had not contracted with the
owner, give notice of his intention to claim a lien.8 The third approach
would be to file one notice in the county clerk's office pursuant to
KRS 376.010(2) immediately after signing the subcontract. If the
lien claimant had not contracted with the owner, he would then have
up to seventy-five days after finishing his work on the last house to
give notice as required by KRS 376.010(3).
James Avery Shuffett
SECUIUTIEs-ExPANDED CONCEPT OF F AuD-INvES ENT Anviss Acr
OF 1940.-The Securities and Exchange Commission brought this action
against the defendant, a registered investment adviser. On several
occasions defendant bought shares of stock for its own account.
Shortly after each purchase it recommended the purchased security
to clients for long term investments. Following a rise in the market
price of the recommended security, defendant immediately sold its
shares at a profit. The defendant failed to disclose these transactions
to its clients. The Commission requested an injunction under the
Investment Advisers Act of 19401 compelling defendant to disclose
to its clients any dealings in recommended securities. The United
States District Court of New York denied relief. 2 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.3 Certiorari was
granted. Held: Reversed and remanded. The Commission may obtain
an injunction compelling an investment adviser to disclose to clients
8 True, the houses which had been conveyed and their deeds recorded
would escape his lien, as this case so holds, but KRS 376.060 provides a remedy:
!fthe owner of . .. land or improvements thereon contracts for . . .
material used in the erection . . . of any structure thereon under such
circumstances that a lien for the payment thereof may attach to the
property, and sells . . . the property before the expiration of the time
provided for the filing and recording of a . . . materialman's lien, he
shall, on receiving the consideration for the sale . ., pay in full any
sum owing for . . . materials, unless released in writing by the person
furnishing the . . . materials... . (Emphasis added.)
The above statute entitles the subcontractor to a personal judgment for those
amounts not covered by an enforceable lien. It provides for the personal judgment
since all the houses sold were sold (1) at a time when a lien might attach, (2)
before the expiration of the time for filing the lien, and (3) when the lien could
not attach because of the provisions of KRS 376.010(2). This is true by virtue of
the fact that we proceeded under one non-severable contract whereby the time
limits of KRS 376.010(2) and KRS 376.010(3), needed to perfect the lien, did
not begin running until the completion of the last house. Will B. Miller Co. v.
Laval, 283 Ky. 55, 140 S.W.2d 376 (1940); Paterson v. Miller, 283 Ky. 60,
140 S.W.2d 879 (1940). .
154 Stat. 847 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (1960).
2 191 F. Supp. 897 (1961).
3 300 F.2d 745 (1961), aff'd on rehearing 306 F.2d 606 (1962).
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a practice known in the securities industry as "scalping."4 This practice
"operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client"
within the meaning of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.5 Mr.
Justice Harlan dissented. Securities & Exch. Comr'n v. Capital Gains
Research Bur., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
The Supreme Court in this decision has expanded the traditional
common law concept of fraud. It held that Congress did not intend
the fraud provisions of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 to be
confined by common law fraud concepts. In its broad construction of
this act the Supreme Court did not require the Commission to prove
that defendant intended to injure its clients; nor was the Commission
required to show that the clients received an actual injury. Both these
elements are necessary to establish fraud in its technical sense as re-
quired at common law.6 The lower federal courts construed the act
technically, requiring that at least some evidence be shown that the
adviser's recommendations are not disinterested.7 The Supreme Court,
however, held that nondisclosure of the practice of scalping is sufficient
in itself to establish fraud.
Because Congress did not expressly provide in this act that failure
to disclose material facts is unlawful, as it did in the Securities Act of
1933,8 courts have been reluctant to treat nondisclosure as fraud under
the Investment Advisers Act. Most injunctive actions brought against
investment advisers by the Commission have been dismissed for lack
of proof. Many courts in the past, both state and federal, have
refused to drop the rigid requirements necessary to establish fraud at
common law. Failure to prove that an adviser had a dishonest intent
to injure his clients (financially) has often been accepted as grounds
for dismissal.
In the principal case, the Supreme Court was faced with a problem
of construction. Assuming Congress adopted the concept of common
law fraud in the Investment Advisers Act, did Congress intend that
the courts construe the act technically or did it intend a broad
remedial construction? The Court properly concluded that the act
must be construed broadly to carry out its purpose which is similar to
4 The term "scalping" refers to the practice of investment advisers trading
for their own account in securities which they recommended to their clients.
6 54 Stat. 852, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6, in relevant part prohibits any
investment advisor: (1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any
client or prospective client; and (2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or
course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or
prospective client."
3 Loss, Securities Regulations 1431 (2d ed. 1961).
7 306 F.2d at 608-609; 191 F. Supp. 897 (1961); contra, Prosser, Law of
Torts 538 (1955).
848 Stat. 74 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77 1960).
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the purposes of other acts designed to eliminate fraud in the securities
industry.
A first ground of support in favor of this expansive construction
is found in a brief analysis of the development of fraud in courts of
common law and equity. From the beginning, common law courts
refused to define fraud in precise language.9 Certain elements, dif-
ficult to prove, were held essential to establish fraud "in a damage suit
between parties to an arms-length transaction." 0 These courts "re-
garded fraud as primarily a tort,"' whereas courts of equity gave
fraud a broader meaning. "Equity" did not regard an intention to
misrepresent as an essential element of fraud.12 These equity courts
later regarded fraud as including all concealments involving a breach
of a legal or equitable relationship and "by which an undue uncon-
scientious advantage is taken of another."13 A duty of full disclosure
of all material facts was imposed on those occupying fiduciary posi-
tions. To obtain equitable relief against one in a fiduciary position,'4
a party no longer had to establish the elements essential in an action
against "a party to an arms-length transaction."
As early as 1909, in Ridgeley v. Keene,'5 a New York court recog-
nized that an investment adviser, who failed to disclose to his clients
an agreement that he had been paid to recommend a certain stoci;
had committed a fraudulent act. The adviser's plea, that the recom-
inendation was made with the honest intention that his clients would
profit, failed to excuse his nondisclosure.
A second ground of support is found in the legislative history
behind the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. The Securities and
Exchange Commission was authorized to make a study of investment
advisory services. The report made by the Commission, with certain
modifications, served as a basis for the above act.' 6 The final report
reflected the attitude that investment advisers occupy a fiduciary
relationship with clients and should maintain an impartial and dis-
interested position; advisers should not engage in any transactions that
might adversely affect the interests of their clients. A purpose finda-
9 State v. Whiteaker, 118 Ore. 656, 661 (1920); 247 Pac. 1077, 1079 (1920).
10 See cases cited in 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 2 (1943).
11 Hanbury, Modern Equity 643 (8th ed. 1962).
12 Defuniak, Handbook of Modem Equity 235 (2d ed. 1956).
13 Moore v. Crawford, 130 U.S. 122, 128 (1889).
14 See generally, Deeton, Fraud-Concealment and Nondisclosure, 15 Te.xas
L. Rev. 1.
15 134 App. Div. 647 (1909), 119 N.Y.S. 451 (1909).
16 See generally, Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, Report of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, Pursuant to Section 80 of the Public
Utilities Company Act of 1985, on Investment Trust and Investment Companies,
H. R. Doe. No. 447, 76th. Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1939).
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mental to this study, and to the securities acts coming before it, "was
to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of
caveat emptor."7 This was done in an attempt to protect the increas-
ing number of people investing in securities.
The decision in the principal case marks a significant advance in
the gradual expansion of the concept of fraud. Although "fraud" shall
remain one of the most ambiguous legal concepts, this decision has
cleared the way for courts to go beyond a technical construction of
the fraud provisions in the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. Courts
maust carefully consider the balance of interests involved in construing
fraud provisions under securities acts. Security dealers in fiduciary
positions maintain an advantage over their clients. To insure a high
standard of ethics in the securities industry, courts must guard against
potential fraud by requiring disclosure of such practices as "scalping."
Leon L. Hollon
CBinNA LA--HoICmE-INSmU rUoNS.-Defendant was convicted
of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to twenty-one years in
prison. When the offense occurred, defendant was intoxicated and
bleeding from a knife wound in the throat inflicted by the deceased.
Death resulted from the kicking and stomping of the deceased by the
defendant. None of these facts are in dispute. Held: Reversed. The
court ruled that the defendant was entitled to an instruction on in-
voluntary manslaughter since he was intoxicated and there was
extreme provocation. The court further said that even before the
eractment of the new statute' dividing involuntary manslaughter into
two degrees, an instruction on involuntary manslaughter would have
been necessary. Lambert v. Commonwealth, 377 S.W.2d 76 (Ky.
1964).
There are several aspects of this case which are worthy of some
comment. First is the statement by the court that the instruction on
involuntary manslaughter should have been given under the law as it
stood before the new statute.
The leading case on this subject is Maulding v. Commonwealth.2
In that case the defendant was convicted of willful murder when he
kicked and stomped his victim to death. The court said that due to
the excessive brutality of the acts it could not be doubted that the
17 See H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1932).
1 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 435.022 (1962) [Hereinafter referred to as KRS].
2 172 Ky. 370, 189 S.W. 251 (1916).
